---
ticker: "KRBOKMSA"
title: "South Korea Bank of Korea Monetary Stabilization Account Balance"
unit: "tril. KRW"
frequency: "Monthly"
source: "Bank of Korea (2003)"
release: "Updated Monthly"
category: "Monetary Data"
country: "KR"
language: "en"
canonical: "https://kred.dev/en/series/KRBOKMSA"
license: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"
latest_value: 0.40
latest_date: "2026-06-30"
first_date: "2010-10-31"
observations_total: 189
observations_shown: 120
---

# South Korea Bank of Korea Monetary Stabilization Account Balance

## Overview

A term deposit facility that absorbs reserves flexibly without bonds or repo operations.

## Key Figures

|  | Value | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Latest | 0.40 | 2026-06-30 |
| Change from previous | +0.10 | 2026-05-31 |
| Change over one year | +0.20 | 2025-06-30 |
| Highest on record | 25.55 | 2023-03-31 |
| Lowest on record | 0.20 | 2024-12-31 |
| Period covered | 2010-10-31 – 2026-06-30 |  |
| Observations | 189 |  |

## Recent observations

| Date | Value | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2016-07-31 | 10.23 | +1.23 |
| 2016-08-31 | 11.30 | +1.07 |
| 2016-09-30 | 10.00 | -1.30 |
| 2016-10-31 | 15.66 | +5.66 |
| 2016-11-30 | 15.00 | -0.66 |
| 2016-12-31 | 18.70 | +3.70 |
| 2017-01-31 | 14.45 | -4.25 |
| 2017-02-28 | 18.80 | +4.35 |
| 2017-03-31 | 16.00 | -2.80 |
| 2017-04-30 | 16.03 | +0.03 |
| 2017-05-31 | 16.50 | +0.47 |
| 2017-06-30 | 15.00 | -1.50 |
| 2017-07-31 | 15.00 | 0.00 |
| 2017-08-31 | 15.00 | 0.00 |
| 2017-09-30 | 20.60 | +5.60 |
| 2017-10-31 | 15.80 | -4.80 |
| 2017-11-30 | 16.40 | +0.60 |
| 2017-12-31 | 13.50 | -2.90 |
| 2018-01-31 | 13.50 | 0.00 |
| 2018-02-28 | 13.00 | -0.50 |
| 2018-03-31 | 13.37 | +0.37 |
| 2018-04-30 | 17.77 | +4.40 |
| 2018-05-31 | 11.77 | -6.00 |
| 2018-06-30 | 12.92 | +1.15 |
| 2018-07-31 | 13.10 | +0.18 |
| 2018-08-31 | 11.00 | -2.10 |
| 2018-09-30 | 8.00 | -3.00 |
| 2018-10-31 | 8.97 | +0.97 |
| 2018-11-30 | 5.20 | -3.77 |
| 2018-12-31 | 7.00 | +1.80 |
| 2019-01-31 | 7.50 | +0.50 |
| 2019-02-28 | 9.00 | +1.50 |
| 2019-03-31 | 12.00 | +3.00 |
| 2019-04-30 | 9.50 | -2.50 |
| 2019-05-31 | 4.00 | -5.50 |
| 2019-06-30 | 6.00 | +2.00 |
| 2019-07-31 | 8.00 | +2.00 |
| 2019-08-31 | 6.00 | -2.00 |
| 2019-09-30 | 6.00 | 0.00 |
| 2019-10-31 | 5.00 | -1.00 |
| 2019-11-30 | 3.00 | -2.00 |
| 2019-12-31 | 3.50 | +0.50 |
| 2020-01-31 | 6.00 | +2.50 |
| 2020-02-29 | 5.70 | -0.30 |
| 2020-03-31 | 11.00 | +5.30 |
| 2020-04-30 | 10.77 | -0.23 |
| 2020-05-31 | 8.50 | -2.27 |
| 2020-06-30 | 10.00 | +1.50 |
| 2020-07-31 | 8.00 | -2.00 |
| 2020-08-31 | 6.30 | -1.70 |
| 2020-09-30 | 10.23 | +3.93 |
| 2020-10-31 | 6.53 | -3.70 |
| 2020-11-30 | 5.85 | -0.68 |
| 2020-12-31 | 9.25 | +3.40 |
| 2021-01-31 | 8.85 | -0.40 |
| 2021-02-28 | 7.80 | -1.05 |
| 2021-03-31 | 13.80 | +6.00 |
| 2021-04-30 | 12.80 | -1.00 |
| 2021-05-31 | 11.60 | -1.20 |
| 2021-06-30 | 6.65 | -4.95 |
| 2021-07-31 | 9.10 | +2.45 |
| 2021-08-31 | 6.21 | -2.89 |
| 2021-09-30 | 7.40 | +1.19 |
| 2021-10-31 | 8.00 | +0.60 |
| 2021-11-30 | 6.90 | -1.10 |
| 2021-12-31 | 7.00 | +0.10 |
| 2022-01-31 | 5.90 | -1.10 |
| 2022-02-28 | 5.55 | -0.35 |
| 2022-03-31 | 9.00 | +3.45 |
| 2022-04-30 | 8.40 | -0.60 |
| 2022-05-31 | 10.20 | +1.80 |
| 2022-06-30 | 7.50 | -2.70 |
| 2022-07-31 | 19.00 | +11.50 |
| 2022-08-31 | 7.90 | -11.10 |
| 2022-09-30 | 4.73 | -3.17 |
| 2022-10-31 | 9.85 | +5.12 |
| 2022-11-30 | 10.00 | +0.15 |
| 2022-12-31 | 7.28 | -2.72 |
| 2023-01-31 | 15.95 | +8.67 |
| 2023-02-28 | 15.20 | -0.75 |
| 2023-03-31 | 25.55 | +10.35 |
| 2023-04-30 | 13.30 | -12.25 |
| 2023-05-31 | 7.50 | -5.80 |
| 2023-06-30 | 9.88 | +2.38 |
| 2023-07-31 | 10.50 | +0.62 |
| 2023-08-31 | 3.00 | -7.50 |
| 2023-09-30 | 1.50 | -1.50 |
| 2023-10-31 | 1.84 | +0.34 |
| 2023-11-30 | 0.90 | -0.94 |
| 2023-12-31 | 0.84 | -0.06 |
| 2024-01-31 | 0.70 | -0.14 |
| 2024-02-29 | 1.20 | +0.50 |
| 2024-03-31 | 8.54 | +7.34 |
| 2024-04-30 | 1.80 | -6.74 |
| 2024-05-31 | 0.40 | -1.40 |
| 2024-06-30 | 0.50 | +0.10 |
| 2024-07-31 | 1.36 | +0.86 |
| 2024-08-31 | 0.40 | -0.96 |
| 2024-09-30 | 0.90 | +0.50 |
| 2024-10-31 | 0.80 | -0.10 |
| 2024-11-30 | 0.30 | -0.50 |
| 2024-12-31 | 0.20 | -0.10 |
| 2025-01-31 | 0.20 | 0.00 |
| 2025-02-28 | 0.27 | +0.07 |
| 2025-03-31 | 0.30 | +0.03 |
| 2025-04-30 | 0.30 | 0.00 |
| 2025-05-31 | 0.30 | 0.00 |
| 2025-06-30 | 0.20 | -0.10 |
| 2025-07-31 | 0.60 | +0.40 |
| 2025-08-31 | 0.76 | +0.16 |
| 2025-09-30 | 0.80 | +0.04 |
| 2025-10-31 | 0.30 | -0.50 |
| 2025-11-30 | 0.40 | +0.10 |
| 2025-12-31 | 0.80 | +0.40 |
| 2026-01-31 | 0.30 | -0.50 |
| 2026-02-28 | 0.30 | 0.00 |
| 2026-03-31 | 0.70 | +0.40 |
| 2026-04-30 | 0.60 | -0.10 |
| 2026-05-31 | 0.30 | -0.30 |
| 2026-06-30 | 0.40 | +0.10 |

## Definition

The monetary stabilization account (통화안정계정) is a deposit facility introduced by the Bank of Korea in October 2010 that allows eligible financial institutions to place funds for specified terms, absorbing reserves from the banking system similarly to RP sales but without creating tradable securities and with more flexible terms. The facility serves as an additional fine-tuning instrument for interbank liquidity management, offering the BOK a mechanism to adjust reserve supply without altering the outstanding stock of monetary stabilization bonds or conducting repo operations.

The monetary stabilization account fills a specific institutional gap between the BOK's two other absorption instruments. RP sales offer short-term absorption at maturities of 7 to 91 days but require securities as collateral, and MSB issuance provides structural absorption at 91-day to 2-year maturities but involves a public auction process. The MSA instead provides a bilateral deposit mechanism with flexible terms that the BOK can adjust to meet specific liquidity management objectives. A rising MSA balance absorbs reserves and lowers the banking system's available reserves, and within the Net Liquidity formula this balance is subtracted from total assets.

## Methodology

The MSA balance is sourced from the Key Accounts statistics published by the Bank of Korea, corresponding to the monetary stabilization account item. Reported as monthly end-of-period balances, the raw series in billions of KRW is converted to trillions of KRW by dividing by 1,000. The series begins in October 2010 when the facility was established, and this start date constrains the availability of the composite Net Liquidity indicator (KRNETLIQ).

## Applications in Economics

Standing deposit facilities at central banks serve as instruments for managing excess reserves and fine-tuning short-term money-market conditions. Bindseil (2004) provides the foundational analysis of monetary policy operations and documents that central banks worldwide have developed diverse liquidity management instruments whose specific design reflects institutional constraints, market development, and historical path dependencies. The BOK's introduction of the monetary stabilization account in 2010 expanded its operational toolkit for reserve management, adding a bilateral deposit facility to complement the existing market-based instruments of RP sales and MSB issuance.

Berentsen and Monnet (2008) develop a theoretical model of monetary policy in a channel system and show that the design of standing facilities, including deposit facilities, affects the distribution of overnight rates and the efficiency of monetary policy implementation. Because banks will not lend in the interbank market below the rate they can earn at the central bank's deposit facility, the deposit facility sets a floor for overnight rates and reduces rate volatility. The monetary stabilization account operates within this framework, providing participating institutions with an alternative to interbank lending during periods of excess liquidity.

Borio (1997) surveys the evolution of central bank operating procedures and documents the trend toward market-based instruments supplemented by standing facilities that provide automatic stabilization of overnight rates. The MSA fits this pattern, serving as a complement to active RP operations rather than a substitute. Gray (2011) extends this analysis to the balance-sheet implications of different liquidity management instruments and shows that deposit facilities create more predictable reserve positions than market-based operations, simplifying the central bank's liquidity forecasting.

Whitesell (2006) analyzes the design of interest rate corridor systems and demonstrates that the width of the corridor and the availability of standing facilities determine the volatility of overnight rates around the policy target. The MSA effectively narrows the operational corridor by providing an additional absorption channel that prevents reserves from pushing the overnight rate excessively below target during periods of structural surplus liquidity.

## Applications in Financial Markets

For money-market practitioners, the MSA balance provides granular information about the BOK's liquidity fine-tuning operations that is not available from the broader RP sales or MSB outstanding data. Keister, Martin, and McAndrews (2008) analyze the relationship between reserve management instruments and payment system efficiency, finding that the availability of flexible deposit facilities at the central bank reduces banks' need to hold precautionary reserves, improving the efficiency of reserve allocation across the banking system.

Bech and Keister (2017) model the demand for voluntary reserves and show that the presence of a deposit facility at the central bank alters the optimal reserve management strategy of individual banks. When the MSA offers attractive terms relative to interbank lending, banks may prefer to deposit excess reserves at the BOK rather than lending them in the overnight market, affecting both the volume and pricing of interbank transactions. Monitoring changes in the MSA balance therefore provides complementary information to the call rate–KOFR spread (KRCALLKOFR) about the underlying supply-demand dynamics of the overnight market.

Poole (1968) developed the foundational model of optimal reserve management under uncertainty, showing that banks balance the cost of holding excess reserves against the risk of incurring a deficiency penalty. The MSA alters this calculus by providing a remunerated alternative to holding non-interest-bearing excess reserves, effectively reducing the opportunity cost of maintaining a liquidity buffer. Hamilton (1996) extended Poole's analysis to the daily federal funds market and documented that reserve demand exhibits predictable patterns around maintenance period settlement dates, a feature that the MSA can help smooth by offering an alternative reserve management channel.

Afonso, Kovner, and Schoar (2011) provide empirical evidence on interbank market structure and show that lending relationships, bargaining power, and counterparty credit assessments all affect interbank transaction pricing. The MSA provides a counterparty-risk-free alternative to interbank lending, as deposits are placed directly at the central bank. During periods of elevated counterparty concern, increased MSA utilization may signal banks' preference for the safety of the central bank deposit over interbank exposure, serving as an indirect indicator of stress in unsecured funding markets.

## Statistical Tests

Over 186 observations from 2010-10-31 to 2026-03-31, the monetary-stabilization-account balance is integrated of order one on the log-level, with the Dickey and Fuller (1979) test in the Said and Dickey (1984) form not rejecting at p = 0.4604, the Phillips and Perron (1988) test concurring at p = 0.1455, and the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test rejecting stationarity. On the first difference of the log the Ljung and Box (1978) portmanteau rejects white noise at lags 12 and 24, Q = 44.83 and Q = 73.17 at p = 0.000 and p = 0.000. The Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) procedure finds no break in the mean, a reading consistent with the parameter-instability inference of Andrews (1993) on the differenced object (Perron 1989).

This series is an unadjusted monthly aggregate, so the seasonal battery is appropriate and is run, with the HEGY seasonal-unit-root test of Hylleberg et al. (1990), the QS seasonal portmanteau, and the seasonal-dummy F cross-read with Canova and Hansen (1995) finding deterministic seasonality rather than seasonal unit roots (Beaulieu and Miron 1992; Ghysels and Osborn 2001).

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What does the central bank liquidity panel for Korea track?

The components of the domestic central bank balance sheet identity together with the open market operations that add or drain reserves, including repo sales and purchases and the stock of stabilisation securities, plus a net measure of what remains with the private system.

### What does the net open market operations series show?

It nets draining against supplying operations into a single figure, so one number settles whether a period supplied or absorbed on balance. The components are published alongside it.

### How does central bank liquidity differ from the monetary aggregates?

This group measures base liquidity supplied by the central bank; the aggregates measure money and near-money held by the public. The multiplier linking them varies with bank lending behaviour and depositor preferences, so the two track each other only loosely.