---
ticker: "KRTGA"
title: "South Korea Central Government Deposits"
unit: "tril. KRW"
frequency: "Monthly"
source: "Bank of Korea (2003)"
release: "Updated Monthly"
category: "Monetary Data"
country: "KR"
language: "en"
canonical: "https://kred.dev/en/series/KRTGA"
license: "https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/"
latest_value: 4.35
latest_date: "2026-06-30"
first_date: "1990-01-31"
observations_total: 438
observations_shown: 120
---

# South Korea Central Government Deposits

## Overview

The government's account at the central bank, showing how taxes, bond issuance, and spending move bank reserves.

## Key Figures

|  | Value | Date |
|---|---|---|
| Latest | 4.35 | 2026-06-30 |
| Change from previous | +0.98 | 2026-05-31 |
| Change over one year | +1.26 | 2025-06-30 |
| Highest on record | 22.77 | 2021-12-31 |
| Lowest on record | 1.20 | 2004-12-31 |
| Period covered | 1990-01-31 – 2026-06-30 |  |
| Observations | 438 |  |

## Recent observations

| Date | Value | Change |
|---|---|---|
| 2016-07-31 | 2.32 | -1.71 |
| 2016-08-31 | 3.32 | +1.00 |
| 2016-09-30 | 2.01 | -1.31 |
| 2016-10-31 | 3.29 | +1.28 |
| 2016-11-30 | 4.35 | +1.06 |
| 2016-12-31 | 7.17 | +2.82 |
| 2017-01-31 | 2.44 | -4.73 |
| 2017-02-28 | 2.51 | +0.07 |
| 2017-03-31 | 4.55 | +2.04 |
| 2017-04-30 | 2.30 | -2.25 |
| 2017-05-31 | 4.10 | +1.80 |
| 2017-06-30 | 3.33 | -0.77 |
| 2017-07-31 | 2.49 | -0.84 |
| 2017-08-31 | 2.85 | +0.36 |
| 2017-09-30 | 2.37 | -0.48 |
| 2017-10-31 | 2.85 | +0.48 |
| 2017-11-30 | 2.22 | -0.63 |
| 2017-12-31 | 9.94 | +7.72 |
| 2018-01-31 | 1.90 | -8.04 |
| 2018-02-28 | 1.74 | -0.16 |
| 2018-03-31 | 2.36 | +0.62 |
| 2018-04-30 | 2.96 | +0.60 |
| 2018-05-31 | 3.98 | +1.02 |
| 2018-06-30 | 3.11 | -0.87 |
| 2018-07-31 | 3.03 | -0.08 |
| 2018-08-31 | 5.99 | +2.96 |
| 2018-09-30 | 2.79 | -3.20 |
| 2018-10-31 | 3.44 | +0.65 |
| 2018-11-30 | 6.82 | +3.38 |
| 2018-12-31 | 9.78 | +2.96 |
| 2019-01-31 | 2.35 | -7.43 |
| 2019-02-28 | 1.71 | -0.64 |
| 2019-03-31 | 4.13 | +2.42 |
| 2019-04-30 | 5.01 | +0.88 |
| 2019-05-31 | 4.34 | -0.67 |
| 2019-06-30 | 4.95 | +0.61 |
| 2019-07-31 | 5.24 | +0.29 |
| 2019-08-31 | 3.56 | -1.68 |
| 2019-09-30 | 3.19 | -0.37 |
| 2019-10-31 | 2.93 | -0.26 |
| 2019-11-30 | 2.75 | -0.18 |
| 2019-12-31 | 3.72 | +0.97 |
| 2020-01-31 | 3.51 | -0.21 |
| 2020-02-29 | 1.88 | -1.63 |
| 2020-03-31 | 4.50 | +2.62 |
| 2020-04-30 | 2.70 | -1.80 |
| 2020-05-31 | 2.76 | +0.06 |
| 2020-06-30 | 7.93 | +5.17 |
| 2020-07-31 | 2.73 | -5.20 |
| 2020-08-31 | 3.43 | +0.70 |
| 2020-09-30 | 3.03 | -0.40 |
| 2020-10-31 | 2.51 | -0.52 |
| 2020-11-30 | 2.93 | +0.42 |
| 2020-12-31 | 6.21 | +3.28 |
| 2021-01-31 | 1.76 | -4.45 |
| 2021-02-28 | 3.43 | +1.67 |
| 2021-03-31 | 3.86 | +0.43 |
| 2021-04-30 | 2.74 | -1.12 |
| 2021-05-31 | 3.18 | +0.44 |
| 2021-06-30 | 5.94 | +2.76 |
| 2021-07-31 | 3.03 | -2.91 |
| 2021-08-31 | 8.49 | +5.46 |
| 2021-09-30 | 2.57 | -5.92 |
| 2021-10-31 | 1.98 | -0.59 |
| 2021-11-30 | 2.92 | +0.94 |
| 2021-12-31 | 22.77 | +19.85 |
| 2022-01-31 | 2.90 | -19.87 |
| 2022-02-28 | 3.85 | +0.95 |
| 2022-03-31 | 4.95 | +1.10 |
| 2022-04-30 | 3.24 | -1.71 |
| 2022-05-31 | 6.63 | +3.39 |
| 2022-06-30 | 4.64 | -1.99 |
| 2022-07-31 | 2.87 | -1.77 |
| 2022-08-31 | 6.01 | +3.14 |
| 2022-09-30 | 2.81 | -3.20 |
| 2022-10-31 | 2.54 | -0.27 |
| 2022-11-30 | 3.46 | +0.92 |
| 2022-12-31 | 8.50 | +5.04 |
| 2023-01-31 | 2.26 | -6.24 |
| 2023-02-28 | 2.37 | +0.11 |
| 2023-03-31 | 4.61 | +2.24 |
| 2023-04-30 | 1.87 | -2.74 |
| 2023-05-31 | 5.68 | +3.81 |
| 2023-06-30 | 3.51 | -2.17 |
| 2023-07-31 | 2.48 | -1.03 |
| 2023-08-31 | 3.50 | +1.02 |
| 2023-09-30 | 3.62 | +0.12 |
| 2023-10-31 | 2.49 | -1.13 |
| 2023-11-30 | 2.53 | +0.04 |
| 2023-12-31 | 6.10 | +3.57 |
| 2024-01-31 | 2.02 | -4.08 |
| 2024-02-29 | 2.00 | -0.02 |
| 2024-03-31 | 2.53 | +0.53 |
| 2024-04-30 | 3.99 | +1.46 |
| 2024-05-31 | 3.31 | -0.68 |
| 2024-06-30 | 2.33 | -0.98 |
| 2024-07-31 | 4.32 | +1.99 |
| 2024-08-31 | 2.39 | -1.93 |
| 2024-09-30 | 2.07 | -0.32 |
| 2024-10-31 | 1.98 | -0.09 |
| 2024-11-30 | 2.15 | +0.17 |
| 2024-12-31 | 8.09 | +5.94 |
| 2025-01-31 | 8.96 | +0.87 |
| 2025-02-28 | 1.80 | -7.16 |
| 2025-03-31 | 4.34 | +2.54 |
| 2025-04-30 | 2.39 | -1.95 |
| 2025-05-31 | 2.84 | +0.45 |
| 2025-06-30 | 3.09 | +0.25 |
| 2025-07-31 | 2.39 | -0.70 |
| 2025-08-31 | 2.71 | +0.32 |
| 2025-09-30 | 3.22 | +0.51 |
| 2025-10-31 | 2.76 | -0.46 |
| 2025-11-30 | 2.87 | +0.11 |
| 2025-12-31 | 6.01 | +3.14 |
| 2026-01-31 | 2.56 | -3.45 |
| 2026-02-28 | 2.37 | -0.19 |
| 2026-03-31 | 3.87 | +1.50 |
| 2026-04-30 | 2.45 | -1.42 |
| 2026-05-31 | 3.37 | +0.92 |
| 2026-06-30 | 4.35 | +0.98 |

## Definition

Central government deposits (중앙정부예금) are the balance of the central government's fiscal account held at the Bank of Korea, functionally equivalent to the Treasury General Account (TGA) held at the U.S. Federal Reserve. When the government collects taxes or issues bonds, the proceeds move from private-sector bank accounts through the payment system into the government's account at the BOK, and bank reserves fall by the identical amount through double-entry accounting. Conversely, government expenditure draws down this deposit and returns liquidity to the banking system. Because of this symmetric mechanism, fiscal operations redistribute liquidity between the government and private sectors without changing the BOK's total assets.

The series exhibits a seasonal pattern driven by the Korean tax calendar, with the balance rising noticeably around comprehensive income tax filing in May, corporate tax payments in March and August, and value-added tax payments in January, April, July, and October. Government bond issuance also raises the balance, because auction proceeds are first deposited at the BOK before they are disbursed through expenditure. An increase in central government deposits means that liquidity is draining out of the banking system, and within the Net Liquidity formula these funds are subtracted from total assets as balances sequestered at the central bank that do not circulate through the private financial system.

## Methodology

Computed from the Bank of Korea Key Accounts statistics, using the central government deposits item as the raw series. The balance is reported monthly as an end-of-period figure, and the raw series, denominated in billions of KRW, is converted to trillions of KRW by dividing by 1,000.

## Applications in Economics

Central government deposit dynamics create a fiscal channel of reserve variation that operates independently of monetary policy decisions, a phenomenon documented extensively in the U.S. context by Anbil, Anderson, and Senyuz (2020). Their analysis shows that large swings in government deposit balances can absorb or inject reserves equivalent to hundreds of billions of dollars within a matter of weeks, creating financial conditions effects that the central bank must either accommodate or offset through open market operations. The same mechanism operates in Korea, where tax collection cycles and government bond issuance schedules generate a predictable seasonal pattern in central government deposits at the BOK.

Fiscal-monetary interaction must be read through the central bank balance sheet. Borio and Disyatat (2011) provide a broad theoretical framework for this, arguing that government deposit flows are a first-order determinant of reserve supply in most central banking systems, so that ignoring this channel leaves an incomplete picture of the monetary transmission mechanism. In Korea the interaction is particularly important because the BOK operates closer to a scarce-reserves equilibrium, where fiscal-driven reserve fluctuations have more immediate effects on interbank rates than in ample-reserves systems.

Government bond issuance decisions govern the supply of safe short-term assets available to the financial system. Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2015) analyze government debt management from the perspective of optimal maturity structure and show that Treasury issuance decisions affect this supply of safe assets. When the Korean government issues bonds and the proceeds accumulate as central government deposits at the BOK, the financial system experiences a temporary reduction in liquidity that reverses only when the government disburses the funds. Reinhart and Sbrancia (2015) document the historical role of financial repression in managing government debt burdens, noting that the interaction between fiscal accounts and central bank balance sheets has long functioned as a mechanism through which sovereign financing needs affect private-sector financial conditions.

Understanding the timing and magnitude of government deposit flows is essential for disentangling fiscal from monetary impulses in Korean financial markets. Kim and Park (2006) examine Korean fiscal policy dynamics and find that government spending multipliers depend on the monetary policy response, which is mediated through precisely the reserve channel that central government deposits affect.

## Applications in Financial Markets

For bond-market participants, central government deposit dynamics at the BOK are a leading indicator of reserve-supply conditions that affect short-term funding rates and money-market pricing. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) document that the supply of government-issued safe assets affects the pricing of private-sector securities through a convenience yield channel, and shifts in the government deposit balance at the central bank alter the effective supply of safe assets available to the financial system. When government deposits increase, both reserves and the circulating stock of government securities decrease simultaneously, creating a double tightening effect on financial conditions.

Large reserve-absorbing increases in central government deposits push banks toward alternative funding sources. Gorton, Lewellen, and Metrick (2012) extend this analysis by showing that safe-asset scarcity drives substitution toward privately produced safe assets, including repo and asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP). In Korea such deposit increases can affect the pricing of CDs, commercial paper, and repo transactions, with the effect observable through short-term money-market spreads.

Shifts in the central government deposit balance alter the equilibrium supply of safe assets available to the Korean financial system, with implications for the pricing of money-market instruments and the incentives for private-sector liquidity creation. Sunderam (2015) formalizes this channel with a model of shadow banking in which the supply of safe, short-term assets drives the creation of money-like claims by the private financial sector.

For Korean Treasury Bond (KTB) traders, monitoring central government deposit flows provides advance information about reserve-supply conditions that affect the short end of the yield curve. Nagel (2016) demonstrates that short-rate expectations are a primary determinant of liquidity premia in Treasury markets, and that the relationship between overnight rates and term rates depends on the reserve position of the banking system. Greenwood and Vayanos (2014) show that changes in the maturity structure of government debt supply affect bond risk premiums across the yield curve, and government deposit accumulation at the BOK following bond issuance represents the interval during which the issuance has drained liquidity but the corresponding government spending has not yet returned it.

## Statistical Tests

Over 435 observations from 1990-01-31 to 2026-03-31, the Korea Treasury general-account balance gives an ambiguous reading on the log-level, since the Dickey and Fuller (1979) and Phillips and Perron (1988) tests reject a unit root at p = 0.1253 and p = 0.0 while the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) test also rejects stationarity, so no clean order is assigned. On the first difference of the log the Ljung and Box (1978) portmanteau rejects white noise at lags 12 and 24, Q = 373.89 and Q = 571.90 at p = 0.000 and p = 0.000. The Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) procedure finds no break in the mean, a reading consistent with the parameter-instability inference of Andrews (1993) on the differenced object (Perron 1989).

This series is an unadjusted monthly aggregate, so the seasonal battery is appropriate and is run, with the HEGY seasonal-unit-root test of Hylleberg et al. (1990), the QS seasonal portmanteau, and the seasonal-dummy F cross-read with Canova and Hansen (1995) finding deterministic seasonality rather than seasonal unit roots (Beaulieu and Miron 1992; Ghysels and Osborn 2001).

## Frequently Asked Questions

### What does the central bank liquidity panel for Korea track?

The components of the domestic central bank balance sheet identity together with the open market operations that add or drain reserves, including repo sales and purchases and the stock of stabilisation securities, plus a net measure of what remains with the private system.

### What does the net open market operations series show?

It nets draining against supplying operations into a single figure, so one number settles whether a period supplied or absorbed on balance. The components are published alongside it.

### How does central bank liquidity differ from the monetary aggregates?

This group measures base liquidity supplied by the central bank; the aggregates measure money and near-money held by the public. The multiplier linking them varies with bank lending behaviour and depositor preferences, so the two track each other only loosely.